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MILITARY ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
IN NORTHEAST ASIA AT THE AGE OF THE NEW DETENTE MOOD

BY

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In the paper the following is emphasized as the military role of the United States and Japan in Northeast Asia:

- Common concept of forward defense, associated with an emphasis on the defense of Northern Japan (Hokkaido plus northern part of Honshu;
- Further development of the U.S.-Japan security treaty;
- Burdensharing; and
- Conquering the friction between the two allies.

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MILITARY ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
IN NORTHEAST ASIA AT THE AGE OF THE NEW DETENTE MOOD

An Individual Study Project
Intended For Publication

By

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
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
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NORTHEAST ASIA



SOURCE: Japan's Northern Territories

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Japan 1977

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MILITARY ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
IN THE NORTHEAST ASIA AT THE AGE OF NEW DETENTE MOOD

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the global situation has developed within the basic framework of political and military confrontation between the Western and Eastern collective systems centering on the United States and the Soviet Union. Each has different economic and political systems and different ideologies, powerful nuclear forces, and enormous conventional forces. Despite occasional crises since World War II such as the Cuban missile crisis, a nuclear war or a large-scale military clash has been averted because of the efforts to maintain and strengthen a credible functioning nuclear and conventional deterrent by the United States and other Free World nations.¹

Therefore, if there are no direct conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, objectives of both blocs in time of peace are considered like this:

- Maintaining the balance of military power;
- Strengthening the unity of the friendly bloc; and
- Weakening the unity of the opposite bloc.

As the means for the purpose of weakening the unity of the west, the east bloc has used terrorism, guerrilla warfare, public opinion aimed at the mass media manipulation. In doing this the eastern bloc presents a challenge to the freedom, economic power and high technology advantages of the western bloc.

Recently, the Soviet Union, has been developing a new thinking diplomacy or "glasnost." This new thinking includes active development of arms reduction and control, and reduction of military forces to improve the environment on her borders in order to reconstruct its backward economy. This has been called "perestroika" or restructuring the economy.

In 1989, there occurred revolutionary situations in a series of Communist countries: Tiananmen Square in China, and rapid democratization in Eastern Europe. These situations, especially the rapid speed of these changes, were probably not expected by anybody including the countries concerned.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the current situation of Northeast Asia under these circumstances, especially the influence on Japan by the new trends in the Soviet Union, and to discuss the military role of the United States and Japan, and the direction of the development in the military relations between both countries. Japan continues to be the United States' key Pacific ally and the cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the U.S.-Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security, Japan provides a stable, secure, and rent-free environment for U.S. military operations and training, and supplies the most generous host nation support of any U.S. ally. The Japanese archipelago affords U.S. forward-deployed forces geographically indispensable bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the Asian land mass. In light of the new detente mood, the question arises, is the military role of the

United States and Japan still viable and important? This paper addresses this question.

II. COMPARISON OF EUROPEAN AND NORTHEAST ASIAN FRONT

In the European front, one of the most important fronts in the confrontation between East and West, as mentioned before, we can see the rapid development of liberalization and democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the remarkable development in the possibilities for strategic and conventional arms reduction. Such liberalization and democratization have occurred as a result of internal happenings in these countries. This situation appears to have the possibilities for a new era of peace in Europe. Specifically this means the following:

- Accumulation of efforts for peace between the Eastern and Western blocs

- Maintaining the balance of military power by the efforts of the members of NATO, and, greater possibilities for overcoming the various kinds of obstacles to increased peace and stability in Europe

In short, the Gorbachev government appears to regard overall improvements in international circumstances involving the Soviet Union and the creation of a mood of detente as the most pressing strategic objectives. The purpose is to promote and succeed in perestroika.

On the other hand, apart from Europe, Northeast Asia is

another important strategic front. In this area, there are no collective security systems among many countries like NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO); instead there are collective security systems between the United States or the Soviet Union. Also, there are no agreements for the regional peace, like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). From the viewpoint of nationality, each country is independent.

The region around Japan is marked by geographical diversity including the Soviet continent, the Chinese continent, the Kamchatka and Korean Peninsulas, many large and small islands including Japan, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and other seas enclosed by these lands, and also straits leading to the Pacific Ocean from these seas. In addition to this, there is China with a large land mass, enormous population comprising almost one-quarter of the world's population and possessing great military power, which does not belong to either the Western or Eastern blocs. These countries have complex relations and cooperations, so we can say that compared to the European front there is great potential instability in this area. In North Korea, there have been no changes like in Eastern Europe. Extreme military tension continues between South and North Korea.

In short, these countries have different characteristics in political and economic systems, ideology, history and culture, respectively. The U.S. and the Soviet Union are in military confrontation with the Pacific Ocean between them and bilateral security arrangements with either the United States or the Soviet

Union (See Figure 1). Summing up, in this region there is a complicated relationship of confrontation and cooperation.

The power of the Soviet military forces around Japan is increasing, as I will mention below. The Soviet Union has recently proposed arms control and disarmament initiatives, and also announced the unilateral reduction of its forces. But they are still ambiguous in many respects, and as a whole they are vague.


When we compare both important strategic fronts in the confrontation between the Western and the Eastern blocs, it is reasonable that the effort for the stability in the European front will lead one to the possibility of stability in the other front because of the current situation and historical evolution. This effort will be very important to establish the international peace. Nevertheless, it is also important, as mentioned before, to maintain the balance of military power in Northeast Asia including the improvement of the defense posture, and the strengthening of the unity of Western allies as a peacetime strategy. This is necessary in order to increase the stability in Northeast Asia and to continue to develop the effort in the European front.

III. GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPAN

In the context of global confrontation between Western and Eastern blocs, the Japanese islands and three major straits are extremely important for both sides. For the Soviet Union, free

Figure 1.

Collective Security and Other Arrangements in Areas Around Japan



SOURCE: JDA, Defense of Japan, 1989

navigation from their naval base in Vladivostok through the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk is extremely important in case of military conflict with the Western bloc. On the other hand, if one secures key areas around these straits and controls them, one can contain Soviet naval vessels in the Sea of Japan and prevent them from interrupting the sea lines of communication. By doing that, one can block their SLOCs to the Sea of Okhotsk and adjacent key areas along the Sea such as Petropavlovsk and Magadan, whose strategic significance has increased in recent years.

So, it can be said that:

- Japan is located at the place that directly controls the access to the Pacific Ocean for the Far Eastern Soviet forces.

- Japan forms one of the strategic fronts with Europe and the Middle East around the Eurasian Continent. That is, Japan has a very important role as part of the western deterrent strategy against the advance of the Soviet Union in this vital Northeast Asia region.

- Japan is located at the main point of the Soviet defense line in the Far East. The first defense line of the Far East Soviet forces without doubt is along the line from the Kamchatska Peninsula through Kurile Islands. (From the viewpoint of defending Okhotsk, it may be the last line.) The second defense line is from the North of Sakhalin to its South. The third line is the coastal area itself. The Japanese island is located at the point of intersection between the first and the second defense lines.

At this point I would like to introduce a historical fact, that is very important to understand the basic Soviet strategy in Northeast Asia. This is the correspondence which was sent from Stalin to Truman on August 16, 1945. In it, Stalin asked for the northern half of Hokkaido. Although it was denied by Truman, one can easily understand how the Soviets historically wanted to get a port of Northern Japan. (See Figure 2)

The Soviet Union has, since 1978, redeployed ground troops in parts of the Northern Territories, namely, Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan Islands, an integral part of Japanese territory, which is legally occupied by the Soviet Union. The combined strength of the troops stationed on these islands is estimated to be equivalent of a division. The Soviet Union has brought into these islands not only weapons that are normally possessed by its divisions, such as tanks, APCs, various artillery pieces, anti-aircraft missiles and MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, but also 130-mm cannons which usually do not belong to the equipment of a Soviet division. In addition, various trainings have been actively carried out by these troops.² Politically, it is believed that the Soviet Union will force Japan to recognize its occupation of the Northern Territories by continuing its military occupation.

As the other geopolitical characteristic, there is the problem about the distance, that is, Japan is very far from the allied country and very near to the Soviet Union. Although it is about 6,200 km from Hawaii to Tokyo, about 5,600 km from

Figure 2.

No. 363

PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN
TO THE PRESIDENT, H. TRUMAN

Your message enclosing General Order Number 1 received. I have nothing against the substance of the order. It is understood that the Liaotung Peninsula is an integral part of Manchuria. However, I suggest amending General Order Number 1 as follows:

1. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kurile Islands which, according to the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union.

2. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern half of the Island of Hokkaido adjoining in the north La Perouse Strait, which lies between Karafuto and Hokkaido. To draw the demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido along a line running from the town of Kushiro on the east coast of the island to the town of Rumoe on the west coast of the island, including the said towns in the northern half of the island.

This last point is of special importance to Russian public opinion. As is known, in 1919-21 the Japanese occupied the whole of the Soviet Far East. Russian public opinion would be gravely offended if the Russian troops had no occupation area in any part of the territory of Japan proper.

I am most anxious that the modest suggestions set forth above should not meet with any objections.

August 16, 1945

SOURCE: Stalin's correspondence with Churchill,

Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-45

E.P. DUTTON & Co., INC. NEW YORK 1958

Anchorage and about 8,700 km from Los Angeles, it is 700-800 km from Vladivostok to the coast of the Sea of Japan, about 42 km from the south edge of Sakhalin to the north edge of Hokkaido and about 16 km from the Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island) to the east edge of Hokkaido. This means the United States has to reinforce Japan over great Pacific Ocean distances with considerable time and enormous transportation power. Besides in wartime, they have to do this under threat from sea and air.

In recent years Japan has taken on an increasing share of its defense burden. As a result of Japan's acceptance of a division of roles and missions with the United States, and its defense buildup to enable it to perform those missions, the U.S. has been able to increase the effectiveness of its forward deployed military presence in the entire East Asia region. Recent combined exercises have demonstrated an impressive capability for combined naval and air defense operations.

Japan's security policy is based on three principle elements. Japan's own defensive power provided by the self-defense forces (SDF); the security partnership with the United States based on the mutual security treaty; and the non-military aspects of security provided by official development assistance, diplomatic initiatives, stockpiling of critical resources.

Japan's commitment to improve its self-defense capability is clearly demonstrated in the ongoing implementation of the Five Year Defense Buildup Plan (The MTDP). The cabinet's approval of

the plan's funding level of 18.4 trillion yen provided Japan Defense Agency's equipment acquisition and force structure plans with added authority. This authority was further strengthened by the adoption of the plan's spending and acquisition goals as the guidelines for determining annual defense budget levels.

Although one-percent of GNP ceiling's demise does not presage future drastic expansion of defense spending, it resulted in a 1989 defense budget of nearly 2935 billion yen,-- a great leap from the 2335 billion yen level of 1984. This then ranked Japan fifth or sixth in the world in terms of the size of its defense budget.

Japan continues to see itself first as a U.S. ally and a member of the west, and only second as an Asian country. This strong affiliation with the U.S. and the west is based on Japan's broad range of shared interests and values with the industrial democracies, and also derives from a shared perception of the Soviet threat. As a result of this alignment, the Government of Japan has consistently supported the U.S. foreign policy objectives throughout the world.

IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN THIS AGE

Since the mid-70's, the improved range of Soviet SLBMs has changed the strategic circumstances surrounding Japan and the Nordic countries. At that time, Soviet SSBNs with retaliatory strike missions against the United States had to be deployed

along the U.S. coast, because their range was only about 3,000 km. However, as Delta III, IV and Typhoon type submarines became operational, the range of those missiles was extended to more than 6,000 km, and they came to be able to launch second strikes from areas close to the Soviet coast, such as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea. Among possible firing positions for Soviet submarines, the Sea of Okhotsk would be one of the most favorable areas because of the good protection provided by the Kurile Islands against a United States naval attack.

V. THE TREND OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FAR EAST

1. STRENGTHENING OF THE SOVIET FORCES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

A. OVERALL MILITARY POSTURE

Triggered by the intensified confrontation between China and the Soviet Union during the 1960s, the Soviet Union began to increase and strengthen its military forces. Consequently, the Soviet forces in the Far East have possessed nuclear and conventional forces, both corresponding to one-fourth or one-third of the entire Soviet forces. The accumulation of its military strength has been conspicuous today. In May 1989, when General Secretary Gorbachev visited China, he announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce 120,000 military personnel, 12 divisions, 11 air force regiments and 16 naval vessels within two years. These initiatives and proposals, however, are still ambiguous in many respects, and they are very vague, as mentioned before. Accordingly, even if the arms reduction was put to practice in accordance with the

announcement, it will be doubtful that the Soviet military pressure in the Far East will be basically lessened. Rather there is a possibility that the reorganization and rationalization of the Soviet forces in the Far East will be promoted further and its military forces will be modernized at a more speedy pace, by eliminating obsolete equipment.³

B. NOTEWORTHY POINTS CONCERNING SOVIET FAR EAST DEPLOYMENT

Looking at the deployment of the Soviet forces in the Far East, the Soviet Union deployed its forces with emphasis on regions such as the coastal area, Sakhalin, the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka Peninsula which are geographically close to Japan. This can be seen in the ground forces deployed in Japan's Northern Territories in 1978. As a result, of all ground and air forces in the Far East, about 60 percent of all divisions are stationed in these areas; about 60 percent of fighter planes (about 80 percent as far as the fourth-generation fighters are concerned) and about 80 percent of bombers.⁴

In addition, the Pacific Fleet, the most powerful fleet of the Soviet naval fleets, is deployed with its base at Vladivostok. Thus, most of Soviet forces in the Far East are deployed in these areas, today. Also, one attack helicopter regiment, including MI-24s which seem to have been transferred from Afghanistan, was deployed recently to Sakhalin. Thus, anti-ground attack capability has been enhanced, and has very important significance due to the short distance between Soviet


bases and Japan.⁵ (See Figure 3.)

The Pacific Fleet has amphibious assault and landing ships including Ivan Rogov-class. A naval infantry division, the only unit of its kind in the Soviet Navy, is also assigned to the fleet. Thus efforts have been made to modernize its equipment and improve the operational capability on both sea and land. In addition, reinforcements have been made in the fleet of merchant ships including LASH and RO/RO ships, both of which can be converted for military purposes. Here, we need to pay attention to the increasing ability of invasion at the same time. Reportedly, the Soviet Union reduced 57 vessels of the Pacific Fleet during the last 5 years. However, most of these vessels were superannuated ones and included a large number of small-sized boats, such as minesweepers. Therefore, they are not regarded as substantial reduction of strength in the Pacific Fleet.⁶

The third-generation aircraft, such as MIG-23/27 Flogger and SU-24 Fencer account for about 70 percent of all the fighters deployed in the Far East. The fourth-generation aircraft, such as MIG-31 Foxhound, SU-25 Frogfoot and SU-27 Flanker represent about 10 percent of the total. The deployment of the fourth-generation aircraft has been continuously increased. The Soviet fighters generally demonstrate the trend of expanding their combat radius and increasing their payload as the generation proceeds. The addition of these fourth-generation aircraft has upgraded the Soviet air force's attack capabilities over the Sea

Figure 3.

Soviet Military Deployments in Areas Close to Japan



SOURCE: JDA, Defense of Japan, 1989

of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and the surrounding areas.⁷ (See Figure 4.)


As mentioned previously, the Soviet Union has brought into the Northern Territories not only weapons that are normally possessed by its divisions, such as tanks, APCs, various artillery pieces, anti-aircraft missiles and MI-24 Hind attack helicopters, but also long-ranged 130-mm cannons which usually do not belong to the equipment of a Soviet division. Furthermore, MIG-23 Flogger fighters whose deployment started in 1983 now numbers about 40 aircraft at the Tennei Air Base on Etorofu Island.⁸

C. MANEUVERS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS AROUND JAPAN

In the areas around Japan, the Soviet military maneuvers and activities have continued active. In particular, military ships and aircraft have been stepped up toward almost actual combat operations. Large-scale maneuvers by ground forces have tended to increase since 1987. Above all, in the area around Sakhalin Island and Northern Territories, large-scale integrated maneuvers, including landing exercises are conducted in line with military buildup in the Sea of Okhotsk region. In addition, Soviet aircraft, suspected of being engaged in offensive training against ASDF radar sites, have continued such trainings. In parallel with increased deployment of the fourth-generation fighters, the activities of the Soviet military aircraft have been accelerated. Recently, they seem to have advanced into the airspace over the Pacific Ocean to practice long-distance

Figure 4.

Operation Radii of Soviet Fighter Planes (an example)



SOURCE: JDA, Defense of Japan, 1989

interception training and offensive training combined with the Mainstay AWACS aircraft. The activities of the Soviet military aircraft have been conspicuous as a whole in the direction toward actual combat and aggressive operations.⁹

2. THE INFLUENCE ON JAPAN BY THE SOVIET'S DEFENSE POSTURE

It will take considerable time for us to determine whether Soviet military doctrine will be changed completely by its doctrine of Defense Sufficiency, or not. However, this possibility may be able to have the following influence on Japan.

- In order to inhibit the defense effort of Japan, by promoting the doctrine of Defense Sufficiency, they the Soviets may attempt to influence Japanese public opinion, and propose various kinds of approaches to solve the Northern Territories problem. Such approaches may in fact act to divide Japanese public opinion against the Soviet Union.

- In order to inhibit the strengthening defense effort of the United States military posture in the Pacific area, under the aegis of the Defense Sufficiency doctrine, the Soviets may propose arms control measured against the United States Forces Japan and Japan Self Defense Forces, and stifle the defense program and military training.

- The tendency of strengthening the Soviet Forces posture in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk, increases tensions in the area by increasing quality of military power and by the modernization and streamlining of Soviet forces. In recent years Soviet fleet exercises and flying missions (training), suspected

to be directed against Japanese radar sites, have been stepped up in areas close to Japan. Such activities by Soviet forces in the Far East not only create a potential threat to Japan, but also as noted above make the military situation in this area quite tense. (See Figure 5)

3. THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICY TOWARD JAPAN


Soviet President Gorbachev recognizes that Japan is a very important nation for the Soviet Union and has emphasized the need to improve the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union. In fact according to recent reports the Soviet Foreign Ministry has upgraded and restructured its Japan section in preparation for President Gorbachev's scheduled visit to Japan in 1991.¹⁰

President Gorbachev has made three major speeches in recent years about Japan: the Vladivostok speech - July 1986, the Krasnoyarsk speech - September 1988, and the speech in China - May 1989. Judging from these speeches, the main objectives of Soviet policy toward Japan are as follows:


- to estrange Japan and the United States,
- to force Japan from the United States-Japan-South Korea military triangle,
- to stop Japan from becoming the United States nuclear base,
- to develop the economic cooperation with Japan especially for the Far East Area.

Figure 5.

**Large-Scale Exercises by
Soviet Far Eastern Military Forces**



**An Example of Soviet Military Aircraft Flight Paths
for Presumed Attack Training Against Radar Sites**



SOURCE: JDA, Defense of Japan, 1989

VI. MILITARY ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

- DIRECTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY RELATIONS -

Following the analysis about the geopolitical characteristic of Japan and the trend of the Soviet Union in the Far East, I would now like to discuss the military role of the United States and Japan in the Northeast Asia from the viewpoint of maintaining the balance of military power and strengthening the unity.

1. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER

In order to maintain the balance of military power, Japan does not need to change greatly the current alliance framework, that is, the revised 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty. As set forth in the "Basic Policy for National Defense," the objective of national defense is to "to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles."¹¹ For that purpose, Japan possesses the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and firmly maintains the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Despite these "twin pillars" of defense policy buttressing the U.S.-Japan alliance a clear common defense concept applying to the area around Japan is still needed. Specifically the following applies: The Japan-U.S. security arrangements, whose core is the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, ensures that an armed attack against Japan by an outside party could possibly be confronted directly by not only SDF, but also the immense U.S. military power. This would mean that the aggressor would hesitate launching an attack against Japan,

because of fears of the considerable sacrifice it is likely to suffer, in effect, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements works to prevent aggression.

However, with regard to the future efficacy of the U.S.-Japan security alliance the following assumptions apply:

- Although it is difficult for Japan Self Defense Forces to increase the number of its forces it can be expected to improve their quality.

- The level of U.S. conventional military power in this Northeast Asian area is expected to remain the same or slightly below the current level.

Nevertheless, in order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan and the U.S. should seize every opportunity to conduct continued dialogue, and thereby establish the relationship of mutual trust and cooperation. At the same time, the two countries should respectively fulfill their responsibilities commensurate under Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, and strive to have their security arrangements function effectively.

While the majority in Japan remains firmly committed to close security ties with the United States, there is a small but entrenched ideological opposition to security ties with the United States and to the existence of Japan's own Self Defense Forces. They are represented by the Japan Communist Party and some elements of the Japan Socialist Party. While this

opposition is vocal, a more realistic attitude toward U.S.-Japan security ties and the need for Self Defense Forces continues to grow within the Non-Communist Parliamentary opposition.¹²

THE POSTURE FOR THE DEFENSE

In time of war, it is expected that the Soviet strategy would be as follows:

- to attack with naval and air forces on targets of political, economic and strategic importance within the Japanese territory,
- to invade by sea and air with sizable numbers of ground troops supported by naval and air forces on land of strategic importance in Northern Japan , and
- to disrupt our sea lines of communication by submarines, surface ships and aircraft.

Therefore, air defense, protection of SLOCs and anti-landing defense are the primary operations necessary for Japan's defense.

These operations will be fought jointly and with the United States assistance. Considering the strategic importance of Northern Japan (Hokkaido plus the northern part of Honshu because of the Tsugaru Strait), we need to place emphasis on the defense of Northern Japan by establishing an effective defense with limited forces. Furthermore, there is a fear of allowing the invasion force to come ashore in a very short time, and the possibility that United States reinforcements would take too long to arrive. This means the credibility of deterrence becomes

to arrive. This means the credibility of deterrence becomes limited. So thus, it is very important to destroy the invading forces in the forward area at an early stage of invasion in order to avoid the danger of a successful invasion. Today, this concept is possible, even with an enemy's air and sea superiority, due to great improvement of current military technologies, accurate fire over long ranges, high lethality of weapons, new fortification technologies, and C3I. This forward defense posture to repel aggression will prevent the Soviets from having free navigation through the Soya and Tsugaru Straits. Thus, this concept of forward defense, associated with an emphasis on the defense of Northern Japan, will greatly contribute to the deterrent strategy of the Western alliance. After noting this defense posture, it is important to develop and validate this concept within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in order to maintain the military balance.

2. STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITY

A. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY

The 'Treaty of Security Between U.S. and Japan' took effect in 1952 and was revised in 1960. Historically, this treaty has contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East about 36 years after the Korean War. At first, I will describe the significance and effectiveness of this revision, because it is important to understand the basic directions of policy for the further development of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

SIGNIFICANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REVISION IN 1960

'Treaty of Security Between U.S.-Japan' was changed to 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between U.S.-Japan' in 1960 and the following was added:¹³

- to encourage closer economic cooperation between both countries
- to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in both countries
- to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations

This change was not surprising. Although a military alliance is originally an agreement between countries that specifies the established common military actions under certain political situations, recent treaties usually include the provisions also about the development of the economy and culture between them. But there is a great significance for Japan and the Japanese people. As this treaty came to provide for the promotion of bilateral cooperation in economic matters, it came to be better understood by the Japanese people, who have much aversion to the military matters. Also through this time period, the Japanese government has been able to have a chance to ratify the importance of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by way of various referendums. With the Basic Policy for National Defense established in 1957, it was noted that it was necessary to deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. The position of this Treaty became inviolable, and

contributed to the development of further U.S.-Japan security arrangements and has played an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.

BASIC DIRECTIONS OF POLICY FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY

As stated in the foregoing, Japan has been improving its defense capabilities in accordance with the Mid-Term Defense program, which is in being until Fiscal Year 1990. Because of this, with respect to defense improvement following the termination of the Mid-Term Defense Program, the government at a meeting of the Security Council of Japan, held December 22, 1968, reached accord on the need to continue formulating a new mid-term defense program and decided to study on a gradual basis.

In formulating the new Mid-Term Defense Program, it is clear from the decision made by the Cabinet in January 1987, that the government should continue carrying out moderate defense improvements in accordance with a November 1976 Cabinet decision under the constitution. Furthermore, the basic defense-oriented policy should take exclusively into account the international situation, as well as the economic and fiscal situations.

The new Mid-Term Defense Program stresses the following points about U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. Priority should be given to functional and regional sharing and interoperability, of equipment.

The quality of U.S.-Japan Combined Training must be developed. Specifically, it is necessary to clarify the position of training by expanding scenarios, in order to have it become a joint combined exercise and gain a linkage between U.S. and other countries in the countries.

Encourage cooperative relations developing equipment and technology. The codevelopemnt of equipment and the transfer of of military technologies are very important from the standpoint of not only developing effective equipment by consolidating advanced U.S. and Japanese technologies but also futhering cooperative relations between both countries.

U.S.-JAPAN BURDENSARING

Two key burden sharing initiatives concluded in 1987 and 1988 continue to provide additional Japanese financial support for Japanese workers on U.S. Bases. The 1987 Labor cost sharing special agreement called for the Government of Japan to fund up to one half of the special allowances and bonuses paid to these workers (under the local compensation system, these allowances and bonuses amount to roughly one-half of total compensation costs). In 1988, Japan agreed to amend the 1987 special agreement, enabling the Government of Japan to pay these benefits in full by 1991. The Japanese Defense Agency's current defense budget request for Fiscal Year 1990 (beginning April 1, 1990), contains funding for the Government of Japan to assume 100 percent of these costs in the next year, up from the current 75

percent. This arrangement should ultimately mean over 10 million dollars in additional labor cost sharing for Japanese base workers. Japan is shouldering approximately 418 million dollars in total labor costs for Japanese base workers in the current fiscal year, up from approximately 370 million dollars last year. Japan's underwriting of allowances, benefits and other labor costs for the 22,000 base workers is essential to the maintenance of a stable work force in the face of the steadily strong yen.

The stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) forms the core of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and the maintenance of the most effective stationing is indispensable to the effective functioning of the deterrent provided by the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Therefore, it is necessary not to undermine U.S.-Japan security arrangements by requesting the Japanese government to shoulder all the stationing costs of the USFJ. (Other aspects of these arrangements will be discussed below.)

Based on the study about functional and regional interoperability, mentioned above, it is necessary to push ahead with plans to preposition heavy equipment in peacetime. This is because the power of JSDF is based on the assumption that due to the vast geographical separation rapid reinforcement of U.S. forces will be difficult in emergency situations.

B. BURDENSARING

We need a lot of expense to maintain the balance of military power in quality as well as in quantity. So, it is necessary for the free World nations to bear the reasonable expense and to maintain the balance as the whole western bloc, especially when the power of economy in the United States is becoming relatively lower. So here I'd like to describe the basic directions of policy for the smooth development of burdensharing so as not to give the chance to the Soviet Union.

In short, we can say that the current military alliance is a symbol of the strongest connection between countries and can support the national interest of both countries. It is necessary that almost all government departments in both countries, assist in overcoming the everyday frictions between the two countries.

Some considerations as to the smooth development of U.S.-Japan Burdensharing are as follows:

CONSTRUCTION OF A STRATEGIC PLAN, WHICH IS EASILY UNDERSTOOD

Elements of such a plan might be:

- Determine the quantity and quality of the military power required in Northeast Asia.
- Decide the share of the United States and Japan from the standpoint of world wide strategy
- Consider the domestic affairs of each nation, and amend the share based on the possibility of execution.

- Decide the order of priority to fill the gap between the goal and the present situation.

CONSIDERATION OF ANTI-PROPAGANDA WAR

Unity between the United States and Japan is one of the most important factors in maintaining international peace and security. In this context, a plan for arms control and disarmament especially in Northeast Asia must be developed. Burdersharing is one of the symbols which express the strength of this unity. Therefore, if the Soviet Union tries to alienate public opinion in both countries by a large propaganda campaign, then we need to enlighten the people in accordance with the whole plan. Burdersharing is not understandable for people who are too much accustomed to peace. It gives the opportunity for the familiar communist of disinformation. So, when we have the negotiations with the Soviet Union, we need to have strength and unity between the United States and Japan.

C. CONQUERING THE FRICTION BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIES

It is very natural that there is friction between friendly countries. The closer relations we have, the more friction there will be. However, we had better try to reduce this friction through negotiation. Especially in democratic countries, there is a problem of the public emotion distorting policy created by misinformation. In the words of one writer, "plenty of American politicians think there is mileage to be got out of attacking the Japanese."¹⁴ The Japanese are beginning to

hit back. Witness the book, The Japan That Can Say No.

The issue of the FS-X co-development is an example. According to Defense of Japan 1989, after concluding the Exchange of Notes and Memorandum of Understanding, in May 1989, the U.S. side requested the Japanese side for clarification of these arrangements while it was in the process of proceeding in the U.S. As a result of talks between the two countries, they were clarified at the end of April 1989.¹⁵ On the other hand, according to Japanese sources, Japan originally wanted to develop the FS-X on its own but gave into U.S. pressure to develop it jointly. Despite this, some U.S. congressmen strongly objected to the deal, insisting that the technology transfer would benefit only Japan.¹⁶ The latter expression seems reasonable. In any event, although the United States and Japan enjoy comparatively favorable relations on defense matters, the FS-X issue arose partly because it involved U.S. industrial policy. And this tendency will be continued from now on. So it is very important for both countries to deal consciously with these issues calmly, paying due attention to the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

XII. CONCLUSION

Maintaining a proper perspective amid rising U.S.-Japan friction is naturally a relative matter. That is, an unstable situation is created when it is too small and too big. Therefore, it can be said that it is one of endless patience and

avoidance of extreme viewpoints. It is truly needed, however, for both countries to continue to make a sincere effort to limit these 'family frictions' in accordance with the suggestion mentioned above in order to create a credible U.S.-Japan alliance for Northeast Asia. In short, I would like to emphasize that quick answers and solutions lead to friction and jeopardize the important U.S.-Japan alliance.

ENDNOTES

1. "Defense of Japan 1988," Japan Defense Agency, pp. 4-6.
2. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 45
3. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 39.
4. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 37.
5. "Defense of Japan 1989," pp. 37, 40.
6. "Defense of Japan 1989," pp. 41-42.
7. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 42.
8. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 45.
9. "Defense of Japan 1989," pp. 47, 49.
10. The Daily Yomiuri, 2 February 1990, pp. 1, 18.
11. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 45.
12. "America and Japan - The Unhappy Alliance," Economist, 17 February 1990, pp. 21-24.
13. "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," Shinichi Kamimura, Jiji-Tsushinsha, 1969, pp. 16-17, 109-114.
14. "America and Japan," p. 21.
15. "Defense of Japan 1989," p. 184.
16. The Daily Yomiuri, 31 March 1989, p. 5.